Conference: Physics, Time and Agency
Dates: 6th−7th July 2020
Location: Dublin, Ireland (Trinity College Dublin and University College Dublin)
Speakers: Craig Callender (UCSD), Jenann Ismael (Columbia), Natalja Deng (Yonsei), Stephanie Rennick (Glasgow), Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin), David Albert (Columbia), Huw Price (provisional; Cambridge)
Physics tells us much about the nature of time, but it doesn’t explain why time seems to have a direction, or why time seems to ‘flow’. In response, researchers have paid increasing attention to how agents are situated in time. For example, Ismael and Callender argue that the reason we think of the future as a realm of possibilities is because of how we model time in deliberation and in action. ‘Agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert) accounts of causation use features of how we deliberate to explain why causal relations are directed towards the future. But there is no consensus on the role agency should play in these explanations, or on the upshots for our broader understanding of time. For example, if agency is used to explain causal asymmetry, does this imply that causal asymmetry is objective (Albert), or a matter of our perspective (Price)? This conference will debate the role of agency in physical accounts of time, and will use this debate as a basis to explore the role of agency in accounts of scientific relations more broadly: including causation, laws and chances.
Location: Dublin, Ireland (Trinity College Dublin and University College Dublin)
Speakers: Craig Callender (UCSD), Jenann Ismael (Columbia), Natalja Deng (Yonsei), Stephanie Rennick (Glasgow), Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin), David Albert (Columbia), Huw Price (provisional; Cambridge)
Physics tells us much about the nature of time, but it doesn’t explain why time seems to have a direction, or why time seems to ‘flow’. In response, researchers have paid increasing attention to how agents are situated in time. For example, Ismael and Callender argue that the reason we think of the future as a realm of possibilities is because of how we model time in deliberation and in action. ‘Agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert) accounts of causation use features of how we deliberate to explain why causal relations are directed towards the future. But there is no consensus on the role agency should play in these explanations, or on the upshots for our broader understanding of time. For example, if agency is used to explain causal asymmetry, does this imply that causal asymmetry is objective (Albert), or a matter of our perspective (Price)? This conference will debate the role of agency in physical accounts of time, and will use this debate as a basis to explore the role of agency in accounts of scientific relations more broadly: including causation, laws and chances.
Call for Abstracts
We invite the submission of abstracts for the conference from early career philosophers (students, postdoctoral researchers, and junior faculty within 7 years of their PhD). Abstracts should be suitable for a 40−45 minute talk. Submissions should include a title, a brief abstract (up to 150 words), and a separate extended abstract (up to 500 words, not including references) blinded for peer review. Abstracts should be submitted as pdf files by Sunday 15th March 2020 to isphiltime@gmail.com.
Notification of outcomes will be made by April 15th. Funding bursaries will be available to support the costs of travel and accommodation for speakers. (We will do our best to cover the full amounts, but exact details will be given as they become available, and certainly by April 15th.)
We are committed to fostering diversity and equality. Submissions from underrepresented groups are particularly welcome. The conference will be adopting the BPA/SWIP Good Practice Scheme and the BPA/SWIP Guidelines for Accessible Conferences. The venues of the conference (including restaurants) are wheelchair accessible, with accessible toilets accessible from the conference room. Accessible accommodation will be available. We will do our best to assist those with caring responsibilities (and funds may be available). Please do contact us if there are any specific points on which we need to provide more information.
Organisers: Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin), Daniel Deasy (University College Dublin), under the auspices of the Irish Society for the Philosophy of Time.
Acknowledgments: The conference is organised by the Irish Society for the Philosophy of Time. The organisers gratefully acknowledge funding support from the Mind Association; the British Society for Philosophy of Science; the Department of Philosophy (Trinity College Dublin); the Arts and Social Sciences Benefaction Fund (Trinity College Dublin); the Trinity Long Room Hub Arts and Humanities Research Institute, and the UCD School of Philosophy (University College Dublin).
Notification of outcomes will be made by April 15th. Funding bursaries will be available to support the costs of travel and accommodation for speakers. (We will do our best to cover the full amounts, but exact details will be given as they become available, and certainly by April 15th.)
We are committed to fostering diversity and equality. Submissions from underrepresented groups are particularly welcome. The conference will be adopting the BPA/SWIP Good Practice Scheme and the BPA/SWIP Guidelines for Accessible Conferences. The venues of the conference (including restaurants) are wheelchair accessible, with accessible toilets accessible from the conference room. Accessible accommodation will be available. We will do our best to assist those with caring responsibilities (and funds may be available). Please do contact us if there are any specific points on which we need to provide more information.
Organisers: Alison Fernandes (Trinity College Dublin), Daniel Deasy (University College Dublin), under the auspices of the Irish Society for the Philosophy of Time.
Acknowledgments: The conference is organised by the Irish Society for the Philosophy of Time. The organisers gratefully acknowledge funding support from the Mind Association; the British Society for Philosophy of Science; the Department of Philosophy (Trinity College Dublin); the Arts and Social Sciences Benefaction Fund (Trinity College Dublin); the Trinity Long Room Hub Arts and Humanities Research Institute, and the UCD School of Philosophy (University College Dublin).
Conference Themes
Much of our understanding of time comes from considering fundamental physical theories. But these theories leave certain questions unanswered. First, our world abounds in phenomena that are temporal asymmetric: plants grow, bodies decay, entropy increases, and causes come before their effects. Yet the equations of fundamental physical theories are (by and large) temporally symmetric: they are insensitive to the difference between the past and future. So why is our world temporally asymmetric? Second, time as we experience it has features that time in physics lacks. For example, we seem to experience time as ‘flowing’, and the future as a realm of open possibilities, even though these features aren’t present in fundamental physical theories. How do we reconcile our experience of time with what physics tell us?
To answer these questions, recent work in philosophy has paid increasing attention to the role of agents—creatures that deliberate and act. For example, Ismael and Callender argue that the reason we think of the future as a realm of possibilities is partly as a result of how we model time in deliberation and in action. ‘Agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert) accounts of causation use features of how we deliberate to explain why causal relations are directed towards the future. But this work is in its infancy, and there is little consensus concerning exactly how agency should feature, and what consequences there are for the metaphysics of time. For example, if agency is used to explain aspects of causal asymmetry, does this imply that causal asymmetry is objective (Albert), or a matter of our perspective (Price)? Without answers to these questions, we lack a full understanding of the nature of time and how to reconcile its physical character with our experience of it.
This conference seeks to establish the role of agency in physical accounts of time. The hope is that, by doing so, we will better understand the role of agency in accounts of scientific relations more broadly: including causation, laws, and chance.
A central aim in the metaphysics of science is to provide an account of the nature of fundamental scientific relations that can account for the ways in which these relations are temporally asymmetric. A further constraint is that such accounts should be ‘naturalistic’—that is, they should adhere closely to scientific results and methods in providing an account of what scientific relations are. A recent approach in thinking about scientific relations, at least with respect to causation, has been to consider why scientific relations are useful to us. For example, ‘agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert, Ismael) accounts of causation take causation to be essential for deliberation.
But there are limitations to these approaches. Firstly, the work is in its infancy and it is unclear whether an agent-based approach can actually be used to provide an account of the nature of scientific relations, rather than just a constraint on what they are. A second problem is that it is unclear how these agent-based approaches might be applied to more fundamental relations, including laws and chances. Causal relations do not feature in how fundamental physical theories are formulated (Russell, Loewer, Albert), and so are typically taken to be less fundamental than laws. The standard assumption (Lewis, Hall) is that it if relations are truly fundamental, their usefulness has no role to play in providing an account of them (at least given the naturalistic constraint). So, even if one can give an agent-based account of causation, the going assumption is that this cannot be done for laws and chances. When providing an account of fundamental relations, the standard approach has been, instead, to go ‘beyond science’, and aim at metaphysical accounts that are less naturalistic than those given of higher-level relations. For these reasons, agent-based accounts have not been as well developed for fundamental relations, and are largely absent from contemporary discussions of laws and chances.
By debating the role of agency in physical accounts of time, this conference will help determine the broader prospects for agent-based accounts of scientific relations.
To answer these questions, recent work in philosophy has paid increasing attention to the role of agents—creatures that deliberate and act. For example, Ismael and Callender argue that the reason we think of the future as a realm of possibilities is partly as a result of how we model time in deliberation and in action. ‘Agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert) accounts of causation use features of how we deliberate to explain why causal relations are directed towards the future. But this work is in its infancy, and there is little consensus concerning exactly how agency should feature, and what consequences there are for the metaphysics of time. For example, if agency is used to explain aspects of causal asymmetry, does this imply that causal asymmetry is objective (Albert), or a matter of our perspective (Price)? Without answers to these questions, we lack a full understanding of the nature of time and how to reconcile its physical character with our experience of it.
This conference seeks to establish the role of agency in physical accounts of time. The hope is that, by doing so, we will better understand the role of agency in accounts of scientific relations more broadly: including causation, laws, and chance.
A central aim in the metaphysics of science is to provide an account of the nature of fundamental scientific relations that can account for the ways in which these relations are temporally asymmetric. A further constraint is that such accounts should be ‘naturalistic’—that is, they should adhere closely to scientific results and methods in providing an account of what scientific relations are. A recent approach in thinking about scientific relations, at least with respect to causation, has been to consider why scientific relations are useful to us. For example, ‘agent-based’ (Price, Fernandes) and ‘physics-based’ (Albert, Ismael) accounts of causation take causation to be essential for deliberation.
But there are limitations to these approaches. Firstly, the work is in its infancy and it is unclear whether an agent-based approach can actually be used to provide an account of the nature of scientific relations, rather than just a constraint on what they are. A second problem is that it is unclear how these agent-based approaches might be applied to more fundamental relations, including laws and chances. Causal relations do not feature in how fundamental physical theories are formulated (Russell, Loewer, Albert), and so are typically taken to be less fundamental than laws. The standard assumption (Lewis, Hall) is that it if relations are truly fundamental, their usefulness has no role to play in providing an account of them (at least given the naturalistic constraint). So, even if one can give an agent-based account of causation, the going assumption is that this cannot be done for laws and chances. When providing an account of fundamental relations, the standard approach has been, instead, to go ‘beyond science’, and aim at metaphysical accounts that are less naturalistic than those given of higher-level relations. For these reasons, agent-based accounts have not been as well developed for fundamental relations, and are largely absent from contemporary discussions of laws and chances.
By debating the role of agency in physical accounts of time, this conference will help determine the broader prospects for agent-based accounts of scientific relations.
